This paper presents a chronology of the events subsequent to the attack on the World Trade Center and an analysis of the role of leadership and standard operating procedures in crisis management. It tells the story of the Mayor and his team of emergency response advisors and staff. We describe and assess the role of local elected officials in reassuring the city's residents and boosting morale and in preventing disorder after the catastrophe. And we provide profiles of the actions of local public servants.
liaison between all city agencies involved in emergency situations (Sandberg 2001 ). Prior to September 11, Sheirer's responsibilities included controlling the city's rat population and communicating information to residents about impending snowstorms.
On this day, Sheirer's priority was securing lower Manhattan. To this end, he ordered the police department to close all roads below Canal Street, as well as all tunnels and bridges. He also activated the city's Emergency Operations Center (EOC), a $13 million, 50,000 square foot "Watch Command" located on close the city's airspace (Griscom 2001) . Concerned about additional attacks, Sheirer spoke with NYPD brass, which agreed that NYPD helicopter pilots should be prepared to crash their choppers into any other planes attempting to attack the city (Forty Eight Hours 2002) .
Shutting down lower Manhattan facilitated quicker movement of emergency workers and supplies to the "hot zone" (Archibold 2001) . Police
Commissioner Bernard Kerik, (NYC.Gov 2002) , spearheaded this latter effort.
Kerik met Giuliani and several top fire department officials near the base of the Twin Towers just as the second plane hit at 9:03 a.m. (Marzulli 2001 (Marzulli 2001) . Established in preparation for terrorism threats coinciding with "Y2K", Condition Omega "calls for lightning action minutes after any incident, with thousands of New Yorkers being stopped and questioned and entire sections of the city being closed off" (Marzulli 1999, 6 In the midst of making these decisions, Governor Pataki and senior emergency response officials joined Mayor Giuliani in the first of many press conferences. Though visibly shaken, the mayor conveyed his sentiments and all available information with a calm, composed approach.
I'd ask the people of New York City to do everything that they can to cooperate, not to be frightened, to go about their lives as normal. Everything is safe right now in the city. And the people who are doing the relief effort need all of the help they can get. (McKenzie, et al. 2001, 4) In this and subsequent press conferences, Giuliani acted as the primary spokesperson for the city. "While reassuring the public of the city's safety, he managed to communicate important logistical information such as the number of injured and missing people, details of the [World Trade Center] rescue effort, blood donation information, hospital traffic, transportation issues, and school closings" (Issaka et al. 2001, 5) .
Government Response After September 11, 2001
In addition to hourly press conferences by Mayor Giuliani in the days and Recognizing that some residents in affected areas might not be aware of For all the financial and legislative support provided at the state and federal levels, the primary focus after "9-11" remained in New York City. In the days and weeks following the attacks, Mayor Giuliani was New York's principal spokesperson. Beginning a 7:00 a.m. strategy session with public officials from all levels of government (including Governor Pataki), the mayor's days included walking tours of ground zero to monitor the progress of the relief effort as well as walking tours of hospitals and triage sites. Giuliani also held multiple press conferences each day to keep the public informed on relief and recovery efforts.
"He also appeared almost daily on local and national news programs, each time touting the heroism of the rescuers and the bravery of New Yorkers" (Issaka et al. 2001, 5) . Giuliani worked to inspire as sense of normalcy to his audience, be it public officials participating in the relief efforts or NYC residents watching him speak on television. He also encouraged New Yorkers to resist hatred against Arab nations and Arab-Americans, and adopt a spirit of helping others.
As the days between September 11 and the present turned to weeks, New York City public officials fulfilled their primary duties and the evolving responsibilities created by "9-11". Though many New York City government officials that became familiar to the public after September 11 are gone, their work was neither forgotten nor abandoned by the change in administration. Despite Giuliani's effort to have his term extended, the transition took place, and a new administration continued the city's reconstruction. As superb as his leadership was in the days after 9-11, the institutions of local government in New York City had proven durable and more than capable of peaceful and effective transition.
THE CATASTROPHE AND RESPONSE ANALYZED
For the first several months after the attack on the World Trade Center it was difficult to speak about the attack. Analysis seemed somehow trite and inappropriate. Still, as students of public management, we decided to ask our graduate students to research and analyze government's response to the attack.
Some of the primary and secondary research reported in the previous section of this paper came from this research effort. One of the co-authors of this piece was a teaching assistant during Columbia's fall 2001 public management course. We felt it essential to draw lessons from these events. While we resist the notion that a proper role of research is catharsis, we admit that we began this research as a self-conscious strategy to help our community deal with this terrible tragedy.
What is most striking is the skill and intensity of government's response to the emergency: The quick thinking of the PATH officials sending a train of passengers back to New Jersey and an empty train to Manhattan to facilitate evacuation. The decisions in the local schools to evacuate and for the rest of the city's schools to remain in session, and take particular care in ensuring that all children were met by adults at the end of the day. Decisions to close the bridges, the port and the airports, and of course the Mayor's inspiring personal leadership in the first hours and then first weeks after the attack.
The first finding is that planning for emergencies was clearly present in New York City and helped mitigate the impact of the attack. The modern city is a complex interdependent system. These systems have redundancies, but also great vulnerabilities. Mayor Guiliani recognized the fragility of the city's systems and developed the organizational capacity for emergency response. When some of us outside government criticized his penchant for security, he proved his critics wrong. While his selection of a location for an emergency coordination facility turned out to be a mistake, the planning, training and communication The New York Fire Department's own internal assessment, cited communication breakdowns as a major cause of the failure to evacuate the towers after the order to evacuate was given. According to one report:
Much of the difficulty was a result of hundreds of firefighters who had responded though not on duty at the time. They came by taxi, subway and bus, by foot, or by crowding on to fire trucks on their way to the site. When the order to evacuate came, that meant that many firefighters did not have radios and the department did not know how many were in the twin towers or where they were…The Fire Department…does not know why more of its personnel did not evacuate the towers… It was possible that firefighters had not heard the order, were unable to get out quickly enough, were unable to receive radio transmissions because of an equipment malfunction, or felt they could save a life by staying. (Lipton and Glanz, 2001 B4) The lesson here is that in addition to improved communication equipment, firefighters must reexamine their own standard operating procedures. The direct response culture of the Department saves lives in most situations, but may be inappropriate in the case of catastrophes like 9-11.
At the time of the Trade Center collapse, it was obvious to many that the City of New York was under attack, and the many media induced-images of collective responses and pulling together clicked into effect, as people moved to help each other and escape the scene. The image of the Trade Center's collapse was for many people like a scene from a science fiction movie. While we could imagine such an event, the fact of its occurrence in real life registered, but in some way remained unreal. The effect of these images and these events on mass behavior was visible in New York City, and in coming years should be the subject of detailed analysis.
The decentralization of municipal administration and the size of New York City worked in its favor during and after the attack. Emergency crews arrived on the scene without direct orders to do so. In some cases they acted according to pre-arranged emergency plans, in other cases they came out of a sense of duty and responsibility. Decisions by the Board of Education, school principals, teachers, and New York City Commissioners were made without waiting for clearance from above. Because an image of a worst-case emergency scenario existed in the minds of many key decision makers they responded to these images with actions that were decisive and clear.
A depth of leadership throughout the city was demonstrated on that day and in the following weeks. In our view, our information-based, complex society has provided a leadership culture that permits and possibly encourages innovation. Clearly, this is a researchable question. The Guiliani administration was highly centralized on normal days, but during an emergency, leadership action was inspired, orderly and creative. Why? We have seen this phenomenon during other emergencies. Workers during the home-front mobilization in World War II worked hard and produced at an extraordinary rate. According to one account, at the start of World War II: …Our army had more horses than tanks and Nazi U-boats were sinking American merchant ships with shocking ease. It took a tremendous exercise of American will and power to turn the tide, a national mobilization such as this country had never seen before, and may never see again. And fueling it was raw revenge, retribution for the humiliating defeat at Pearl Harbor. Pearl might be the greatest American victory of the war. It awoke a sleeping giant. But it took almost no time to re-tool the economy for wartime production. The world's greatest automobile society stopped making cars during the war and geared its auto plants to the production of every imaginable instrument of mobile warfare. At Henry Ford's gigantic new plant at Willow Run, outside Detroit, an assembly line a mile long poured out B-24 bombers at a rate of a plane every 63 minutes…. America was a third rate military power in 1940. By 1945 it was producing more weapons and firepower than the rest of the world put together. (Anneneberg/CPB/ Learner.org, 2002 Learner.org, ,1234 On a smaller scale we saw a similar mobilization after 9-11. The threat being more subtle than World War II, the mobilization was as well. But clearly ground zero in New York City provided a less than subtle message. The endless loop of video tape seen by us all of the Trade Center's collapse, and the faces of the members of families that lost loved ones, provided a high level of motivation for workers clearing debris or constructing new tunnels. How does this process work in this type of war, is it different than World War II? Does instant and ubiquitous communication intensify or reduce our reaction to these events?
We had assumed by the spring of 2002 that the financial and organizational effect of the Trade Center attack would be more obvious than it is.
The impact on the City's economy is primarily felt through a decline in tourism.
The recession that began before 9-11 was intensified by the attack and New York City's government budget faced a $4-5 billion deficit in the following fiscal year. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey lost leadership, staff and its headquarters, and in many respects may never recover from the attack. On a daily basis, in mid-2002, the city struggled to provide the resources needed to fund public education, maintain the nation's largest local police force, clean the streets of garbage, and care for its aged, sick and poor population. The resources that were so plentiful in the late 1990's are suddenly scarce again in the early 21 st century. Despite considerable displays of bravado, those of us that live here, young and old feel a sense of vulnerability and sadness that fades, but never disappears.
The remedial economic impact of reconstruction is also difficult to project.
The planning process for reconstruction has been slow and difficult as planners address a wide range of agendas. Some victim families would like to see the entire site turned into a memorial. Residents in nearby Battery Park City would like to see reconstruction provide a more human-scale set of streets and buildings. There are, of course, financial interests that would like to make money off of redevelopment. Some in the tourist industry see a major 9-11 memorial as a lure to world-wide tourism. The economic impact of this reconstruction will be felt throughout the region, but is impossible to measure at this point. Estimates of the Regional Plan Association and others are so contingent that they are best thought of as educated guesses. The early analysis of Comptroller Hevesi of a total financial cost of about $100 Billion over two years has yet to be refuted.
LESSONS LEARNED
What did we learn then? We learned some prosaic operational lessons that we should take care to record:
· Emergency response planning is essential.
· Emergency response institutions, procedures and resources must be retained, even when threats seem distant.
· Communication systems must be made more redundant. Cellular and wired emergency communications systems must have at least two levels of back-up to reduce the odds of failure during emergencies.
· Emergency response procedures must assume communication breakdowns and allow for decentralized decision making.
· There is no substitute for inspiring leadership during a crisis.
However, the more profound lesson we learned is that public service and the ethos of public service is as important as ever. We saw government workers die by the hundreds in performance of their duty. We saw elected officials cast aside partisanship and work together as a team to manage the emergency response, reassure the public and organize for recovery. We saw strength, patriotism, creativity, and incredible dedication to task, from the Mayor to the volunteer passing buckets of rubble down a human chain of rescue workers. The key lesson of 9-11 for public administration is the restatement and reassertion of our central guiding principle, the one that always appears on the inside back cover of this journal: "Serve the Public Interest. Serve the public, beyond serving oneself". When the catastrophe came, our government, nonprofits and citizenry, for the most part responded and lived up to this principle. Public service is hardwired into our culture--into our government, our institutions, and our people. 
Abstract
The destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 resulted in a rapid response by government to evacuate the area and in subsequent days, bring the city back to a semblance of normalcy. This article provides a case study government action in New York City during and after the Trade Center catastrophe. What is most striking is the skill and intensity of government's response to the emergency, and the hard work, dedication and bravery of New York City's government officials. This article presents government and public service at its finest, under some of the most difficult conditions one can imagine.
